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Abstract: This paper is about he importance of applying 
computational modeling and artificial intelligence techniques 
to music cognition a d computer music research. The con- 
struction of microworlds a  a methodology plays a key role 
in the different stages of this research. Several uses of 
microworlds are d scribed. Microworlds have been criticized 
in the domains of artificial intelligence and the cognitive 
sciences, but this critique has to be seen in its proper context 
(i.e. in modeling ofhuman i telligence, not as a methodology). 
It is shown that the microworld approach is still an important 
methodology in music ognition and computer music research, 
and a promising strategy inthe design of a general represen- 
tation formalism of musical knowledge. 
Key Words: Artificial Intelligence a d Music, Microworlds, 
Knowledge Representation, Music Cognition, Representation 
of Time and Temporal Structure. 
Introduction 
Music representation is a research topic with great 
relevance and application in the fields of music 
analysis and production (for instance, music 
notation and retrieval systems), and computational 
modeling of music perception and performance 
(for instance, describing mental representations of 
music). While each domain tends to develop its 
own specialized representations, the central issue 
in music representation research is to describe 
what is shared among these diverse representa- 
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tions. For example, what makes a chord a chord, 
and what properties can be generalized over the 
different representations? This task of constructing 
a general representation of music is difficult to 
imagine and to plan, especially since comparable 
projects of comparable complexity (for example, 
natural anguage understanding) have not as yet 
reached high levels of success. We still lack a 
general theory of representation, "a sobering fact 
since our systems rest on it so fundamentally" 
(Smith, 1991). General representation languages 
are under development, and there are, besides 
lots of technical difficulties, still theoretical and 
philosophical problems of enormous proportions. 
I nevertheless think that it is very important o 
look for generalizations and abstractions in the 
design of a representation f musical knowledge. 
Since the construction of a complete and general 
representation of music is still far ahead of 
us (if not fundamentally impossible), gaining 
understanding of what can and what cannot be 
represented, using certain types of formal repre- 
sentations, is far more important and realistic 
(Honing, 1993). The methodology of constructing 
microworlds or micro-version programs has turned 
out to be a successful strategy in building these 
formalized components of a representational 
system for music, components that are well 
understood and generalized in such a way that 
maintenance and extension are guaranteed. 
Microworlds 
Many of the microworld ideas stem from the 
group of researchers that worked at MIT in the 
seventies (for instance, Abelson, Minsky, Papert, 
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Sussman, Winograd). The notion of a microworld 
has been described as:
Each model - or "micro-world" as we shall call i t -  is very 
schematic; it talks about a fairyland in which things are 
so simplified that almost every statement about hem would 
be literally false if asserted about in the real world. [ . . .  ] 
Nevertheless, we feel that they [the micro-worlds] are so 
important that we are assigning a large portion of our effort 
toward developing a collection of these micro-worlds and 
finding how to use the suggestive and predictive powers 
of the models without being overcome by their incompat- 
ibility with literal truth. (Internal MIT memo, Minsky and 
Papert, 1970; quoted in Dreyfus, 1981) 
Papert and his colleagues developed several 
microworlds for use in an educational context, 
inspired by the cognitive development theory f 
Jean Piaget. These microworlds were designed to 
facilitate learning, and some involved a new 
programming language called Logo (based on 
Lisp) embodying the educational philosophy of 
"learning without being taught" (Papert, 1980). 
The most prominent example of th se microworlds 
is the turtle-world, which models a world of turtle- 
geometry (Abelson and diSessa, 1980). Children 
learned about this world by giving commands to 
a turtle robot or a turtle image on a computer 
screen, and building procedures from them. They 
gained knowledge and understanding of (turtle) 
geometry simply by exploring the possibilities of 
this object. 
Another often referred to example of the 
microworld notion is Winograd's block-world for 
natural language understanding (Winograd, 1972). 
Here, by contrast, not the domain ( .e. knowledge 
about blocks and the ways they can be stacked) 
but natural language understanding is central; the 
microworld of blocks merely serves as a toy 
problem to test the possibilities of a certain 
approach to natural language processing. This kind 
of approach, and the optimistic belief that micro- 
worlds could simply be combined and extended 
into a general knowledge representation, prompted 
much criticism (see for example Dreyfus, 1981) 
which gave the notion of microworlds bad press 
(causing Winograd to take the side of his critics, 
see Winograd and Flores, 1987). This critique, 
though, should be placed in the perspective of 
using microworlds to model human knowledge 
and intelligence, instead of extending the criti- 
cisms to the methodology of building micro- 
worlds. The methodology offers the researcher the 
advantages of what Minsky (1987) called 
"exploratory programming", i.e. to avoid having 
to start with a complete and detailed specification. 
This exploratory programming became an emerg- 
ing methodology in the seventies, an alternative to
more formal approaches, uch as logic. In general, 
the computational modeling approach developed 
into an attractive alternative to more data-driven 
types of research (the experimental sciences). It 
introduced a line of research in music cognition 
that concentrated on the computational modeling 
of the processes in perception and production of 
music, focusing on possible xplanations of these 
processes. The main advantage is that the theories 
(in the form of a computer program) are described 
at a level of concreteness that is "open to direct 
and immediate t st" (Longuet-Higgins, 1973), and 
allows others to repeat the experiments and 
examples given, as well as test the theory on 
related ata. 
As I will show, there are still strong arguments 
for the microworld approach that make it a valid 
and important methodology in the research areas 
of music cognition and computational or system- 
atic musicology. 
Building Microworlds as Methodology 
Our own experience with microworlds tarted 
some ten years ago as an approach in the design 
of composition systems for music, influenced by 
the work of the Logo community (Desain and 
Honing, 1988). Small, but more or tess complete, 
sets of typical composition techniques were 
grouped into different microworlds. Each set 
contained simple program-generators (comparable 
to the forward or right primitives in the turtle 
world) that could be combined into more complex 
but well-understood procedures to generate music. 
Building microworlds developed over the years 
into a methodology that accompanied us in dif- 
ferent areas of music and AI research, concen- 
trating on the perception and representation f 
time and temporal structure in music (Desain and 
Honing, 1992a). 
One of the areas in which we applied this 
methodology was in research on expressive 
timing. 1 By studying existing formal models of 
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expressive timing and reducing them to micro- 
versions that could be applied to the same musical 
data, we could evaluate and compare them. Having 
those models on a manageable scale, sharing the 
same data abstraction, and actually listening to the 
results while changing the model's parameters, we 
were able to indicate some of their restrictions. By 
doing a simple listening test, we could easily show 
that the implicit or explicit use of a particular 
representation of time (the so-called "Tempo 
Curve") is an abstraction with little musical or 
perceptual value (Desain and Honing, 1993). It 
represents empo as a continuous function of score 
time, independent of the musical material (the 
events or notes carrying the expression), assuming 
the possibility to perceive timing without events 
carrying it. 
This prompted us to build a microworld in order 
to express timing in terms of different kinds of 
musical structure. It took the form of a Calculus 
(Desain and Honing, 1992b; Honing, 1992) in 
which one can describe how particular types of 
expression are linked to particular types and levels 
of the musical structure, and how they change 
under, for example, tempo transformations (for 
instance, how a grace note's duration scales up 
compared to a "normal" note with a change of 
tempo, or, how the depth of a rubato is affected 
by the density of notes). Although still little is 
known about his specific musical knowledge and 
its behavior under transformation, the exploratory 
microworld gives more insight on how timing is 
related to specific types of structure 2 and the way 
it is affected by specific transformations such as 
a change of tempo. 
In the next stage of this research this knowl- 
edge could then become part of the representation. 
This can be thought of as constructing little 
machines that have concrete parts and their own 
particular automatic behavior (for instance, agrace 
note's duration scales differently under tempo 
transformations than a normal note). Models of 
expressive timing, or more general models of 
music perception could then make use of these 
"machines" as their primitives, and as such 
abstract from their behavior and concentrate on the 
other levels of musical structure. The goat of this 
research is not to make a model of music percep- 
tion and performance, but to design a language or 
representational system that is powerful enough to 
express the perceptual aspects of it in a general 
and elegant way. This work is the object of current 
research (Honing, 1993). 
The Advantages of Actually Programming 
In fact, programming a certain idea can provide 
new insights. Programming actually forces us to 
answer questions we did not think of before or can 
lead us to see other ways of programming it (for 
example, choosing a different data abstraction or 
control mechanism). A microworld, with of its 
relatively small dimensions, invites us to do things 
differently because not all the work (as in a larger 
system) is dependent on the abstractions chosen. 
Experimenting with the resulting ad hoc formal- 
ization or program may bring out further insights, 
and provide a real understanding, and, in turn, 
possibly a new formalization and an adjusted 
theory. In making problems concrete, deciding 
what is essential and what is not, and changing 
knowledge and understanding from being implicit 
(for instance, hidden in the control structure, i.e. 
the flow of control) to being expticit (for example, 
as data structures), problems become objects, 
objects of thought, that facilitate thinking about 
them - jus t  as the turtle gave children "an object 
to think with" (Papert, 1980), helping them to 
understand more about geometry. 
Is a Microworld More or Less than a Theory? 
A computational version of a theory in the form 
of a microworld has a number of advantages. After 
the formalization of the essence of a theory we can 
recapture its implications and in the process better 
understand how to achieve abstractions and true 
generalizations. To build and, even more impor- 
tant, to use such a microworld formalization will 
most likely bring out aspects not foreseen during 
the design of a theory. It makes the theory concrete 
and verifiable. The construction process itself may 
even influence the design by revealing flaws and 
missing aspects (like in the example on Tempo 
Curves described above). As such, a microworld 
is more than a theory. 
But there are also some negative aspects that 
can "be associated with the construction of 
programs or microworlds. One frequently sees, in 
a computational pproach to music, that a class 
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of problems is described (for example, harmonic 
analysis) followed by a description of a program 
and a description of the results obtained from 
sample problems (for instance, certain chord pro- 
gressions). Often this is just one of a small set of 
problems with an unclear relation to the class of 
problems the program or the methods embody. 
This is what McCarthy (1990) calls the "look, ma, 
no hands" syndrome: thesystem works, but little 
understanding of the domain and problem is 
gainedP It is unclear what the program's limita- 
tions are, which aspects are generalizations, which 
aspects are specific to a particular problem, and 
which can be attributed to a whole class. If these 
limitations are not stated along with the program, 
the program is more or less a black box (although 
we can look into it, the only thing we see are 
details), we cannot derive any abstractions from 
its parts or workings. The program works, but we 
do not know precisely why and, even more impor- 
tant, we have no idea when it would not work. 
There is a danger of loosing flexibility and aware- 
ness of a certain set of untreated problems. A  
such, a microworld is far from a theory. 
Difference from an Expert System Approach 
The microworld approach as a methodology might 
emerge ven more clearly when we compare it to 
the expert system approach. A microworld is not 
just a small expert system, but is actually its 
antithesis. Expert systems or rule-based systems 
accumulate knowledge in the form of a relatively 
large collection of rules. They describe xplicitly 
what to do in a large collection of specific cases. 
Extra rules are added to model certain interactions 
or take care of unwanted interactions (this 
approach is often negatively called patchwork 
rationalism). Rule-based systems can be effective 
when applied to a very restricted domain con- 
taining a relatively small collection of rules 
(Winograd, 1990). As such, they are the opposite 
of microworlds, in the sense that they are 
supposed to embody the near-completeness of 
knowledge with respect to a certain domain 
(obtained by an over-specification of rules). A 
rule-based system is capable of reasoning in cases 
where human beings cannot oversee the conse- 
quences any more (as is the case with, for 
example, nuclear power, law, or medical expert 
systems). Microworlds, on the contrary, are 
designed such that human beings can oversee the 
consequences. Furthermore, where the exploratory 
microworld serves to find all possibilities and 
consequences of a certain micro-theory, which 
interactions are important and which could be 
ignored, a rule-based system is supposed to 
describe all these possibilities and consequences, 
though they are contained implicitly in a large 
collection-of rules and their interactions. It is 
therefore peculiar that there is still a body of 
research that has full faith in this rule-based 
approach to the modeling of musical knowledge. 
For instance, the work of Sundberg (Friberg, 
Fryd6n, Bodin and Sundberg, 1991) describes a
relatively large collection of rules for expression 
(that can be applied to a score, generating an 
expressive performance) without worrying too 
much about heir interactions. 4 Even in the domain 
of Artificial Intelligence there is some deeply 
rooted optimism with regard to the possibility of 
representing the sum total of human knowledge 
using the existing expert system technology (Lenat 
and Feigenbaum, 1991; see also critique by Smith, 
1991). 
The Modularization of Musical Knowledge 
The idea that in music "everything has to do with 
everything", and the consequent belief in the 
impossibility of describing aspects of it in isola- 
tion, finds a lot of support in ethno-musicological 
research. Indeed, there is a large amount of knowl- 
edge, skills and experiences involved in the 
description of all aspects of music (dependent on 
the specific approach to music, be it socially, 
perceptually, or historically motivated). But the 
idea to combine all these different perspectives 
and types of knowledge into one representation is 
quite useless: a universal representation of music 
is impossibleJ It is therefore preferable to use the 
term general. The definition of "general" is 
important here, since it makes significant restric- 
tions. By "general" I mean firstly, a representation 
that describes the measurable and perceptual 
aspects of music (for example, an acoustic signal) 
and secondly, the cognitive aspects that are 
directly involved with this perception (for 
example, high-level musical notions like metre or 
tempo). The latter has its problems. The term 
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"cognitive" refers to models or systems that 
contain knowledge and process knowledge. But 
are there any limits on the knowledge we need for 
our general representational system? Do we have 
to incorporate - besides, for example, knowledge 
on metre - information on the mechanics of 
musical instruments, how the human muscle 
system works (playing these instruments), what a 
concert hall is, etc.? We have to be able to restrict 
the required knowledge. 
Restr ict ions on Modular izat ion 
Is it possible to make musical knowledge modular, 
divide it up in sensible parts? When everything is
important, all world knowledge and skills are 
relevant o such a representational system, and 
modularization of it will be difficult. We could 
start with small portions of that knowledge and try 
to combine them towards a more general knowl- 
edge representation. But when knowledge is 
encapsulated (separated from the rest of the world 
knowledge), it is difficult, and most of the time 
even impossible, to determine what knowledge is
affected and what knowledge is unaffected by a 
certain change or addition of new fragments of 
knowledge to a knowledge base. (This is called 
the "frame problem." See McCarthy and Hayes, 
1981.) If we think of a microworld as a small 
knowledge base, the possibility of extending and 
combining microworlds can be questioned. As an 
example, when we build a microworld with 
knowledge on how timing is linked to the rhyth- 
mical and metrical structure, how is it affected 
when we add knowledge on melodic and harmonic 
structure? 6 
One might then conclude that approaching the 
problem from the other end is a better path to take: 
i.e. to start with describing "everything", the 
whole of world knowledge and skills. Fodor 
(1983) takes an important stand on this. He doubts 
that it is possible to formalize cognitive processes 
at all. They are part of one central system that is 
global, non-modular, and therefore cannot - with 
our current heoretical tools and methods - be 
comprehended, and cannot herefore be formal- 
ized. He considers this lack of understanding as
the basis of a failure in formalizing cognitive 
processes. He thinks the cognitive sciences can be 
and are successful in formalizing the modular 
parts of the mind: the input systems that are "cog- 
nitively impenetrable", ike the five senses and 
language (Fodor, 1983). Only these are a suc- 
cessful domain for AI and psychological research. 
The problem now becomes whether music can 
be considered as being part of this central system, 
or whether it is a module on its own? It clearly is 
part of the first if one takes into account all the 
social and cultural aspects of music; music can be 
a cognitive faculty among a lot of other things. 
But, in restricting a representation f music to, 
first, all the information measurable in the acoustic 
signal itself and secondly, by the cognitive 
processes that directly act on it, it seems limited 
enough to gain some level of success (following 
Fodor's argument)] Within this definition I think 
it is possible to work towards generalizations that 
can form a basis of cognitive models of impor- 
tant aspects of music. 
Conclus ion 
In retrospect we may generalize that theuse of 
microworlds comes in three versions. First, the 
exploratory microworld, with which it is easy to 
experiment with ideas, vague as they are, to gain 
more insight into the problem to be understood 
and modeled. Second, the micro-theory micro- 
world, making a reduced version of a theory in the 
form of a program, so it becomes explicit and 
allows for tests on completeness and internal 
consistency. And third, the micro-version 
microworlds, in which reduced versions of larger 
programs (or models) are made, preferably sharing 
the same data abstraction. 8 In trimming these 
computational theories down to a bare minimum, 
they allowed for better and easier comparison, 
bringing a real understanding of the theory with, 
more than once, the emergence of more abstract 
or general notions as a result. But of course, in 
reality when doing computational modelling all 
three phases gradually transfer. We may, for 
example, have a micro-version of a theory for 
some aspects, but still need more theory on how 
they relate or whether they are complete.. By using 
this micro-theory version to explore, we might 
bring further insight which allows us to update and 
improve the original theory. 
This process of reducing problems to their bare 
essentials, turning them into concrete microworlds 
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which embody them, does not come for free. The 
methodology does not help in making the right 
decisions. A philosophy or strategy has to be there 
as we step through these phases, to help to decide 
what is and what is not important. The most 
important characteristics of a microworld are, 
besides its exploratory strength, the way it makes 
abstract problems concrete, the relative ease of 
finding and making new abstractions and gener- 
alizations within and between related microworlds. 
Finally, every theory and program will have its 
limitations. These should be understood and 
known at all times, and have to be clearly set out 
alongside the description of the microworld. And, 
since they only model a very small aspect of the 
reat world, it is important to provide all the 
information about how to extend and maintain 
them, allowing other researchers to evaluate the 
claims made, compare different solutions, and 
possibly make extensions. 
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Notes 
1 The study of how deviations in timing in a performance 
(with respect o, for instance, a metronomical or mechanical 
performance) are used to communicate structure or the specific 
interpretation of the performer, and how listeners are able to 
perceive and appreciate these deviations. 
2 That they are related we know from a large body of 
experimental research in Music Psychology on expressive 
timing. See for example, Clarke (1987), Palmer (1989), or 
Repp (1992). 
This is especially true in a connectionist orneurode network 
approach to music where it is relatively easy to obtain a rea- 
sonably working system, without having a real understanding 
why it works. 
4 For example, the application of one rule might delay a note 
a little (with respect o its notated onset in the score) while 
another ule might alter that same note to be earlier than 
notated, resulting in no change at all, an interaction not 
described in any rule. 
5 The pursuit of it should therefore be rejected. 
6 Knowledge on melodic and harmonic structure seems to 
be dependent on what is known or described on time (e.g., 
rhythm interferes greatly with the perception of melody) - 
the other way around, starting with time and temporal struc- 
ture (as we decided in our research), allows one to ignore (for 
the time being) the melodic and harmonic structure. 
7 The question, whether music cognition can be described 
as such a restricted and isolated domain, is still open. 
8 Making a micro-version of an existing program is an 
alternative to rational reconstruction, a more established AI 
evaluation methodology (see for instance, Richie and Hanna, 
1990), that encompasses reproducing the essence of an AI 
program's ignificant behavior with another program, con- 
structed from descriptions of the important aspects of the 
original program. In this way, one is able to evaluate the 
published claims made by those programs. 
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